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Abstract
This paper explores how fiscal incentives affect capital tax decisions by local
governments in the Chinese context. We develop a model in which local governments,
facing different fiscal incentives, compete for mobile capital over corporate taxes. The
key prediction of the model, borne out in data from Chinese cities over the years 20042013, is that an increase in the local corporate income tax-sharing ratio, proxying local
fiscal incentives, makes city governments’ horizontal tax reactions stronger. Our results
contribute to the fiscal federalism literature by providing evidence in support of the
argument that fiscal incentives faced by local governments significantly shape their
1
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policy choices. Additionally, we provide explicit evidence on local tax competition
within provinces in China, which has long been regarded as one of the driving forces
of China’s rapid economic growth.

Keywords: Fiscal Incentives; Local Tax Competition; China

JEL codes: H25; H73; H77
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1. Introduction
The nexus of fiscal decentralization and economic development has long been debated
in the fiscal federalism literature. Recent studies emphasize the role of local
governments under decentralized economies (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006). In
particular, fiscal incentives faced by local governments are deemed to have strong
influences in shaping local policy choices, and consequently local economic
development (Weingast, 2009).
This fiscal incentive hypothesis underlines the importance of local revenue
generation. It is argued that fiscal arrangements allowing local governments to capture
a large portion of local revenue are generally correlated with faster economic growth.
This is because local governments care about revenue, and hence they tend to
contemplate how best to generate revenue and take measures to maximize it in response
to different fiscal arrangements (Oi, 1992, 1999; Jin et al., 2005; Goron and Li, 2012).
Thus, a high tax revenue retention rate motivates local governments to promote
economic development to obtain more revenue.
The existing empirical literature has provided either direct or indirect evidence in
support of this hypothesis. For instance, Careaga and Weingast (2003) find that
marginal revenue retention rates for local governments in Mexico are positively
associated with real GDP growth in the country for the period 1980-1995. Singh and
Srinivasan (2006) point out that local governments raising a larger portion of their own
revenue have more incentives to stimulate the growth of tax revenue, which in turn
stimulates local economic development in India. Indirect evidence from other federal
countries such as Russia also shows that economic growth tends to be slow in countries
lacking local incentives (Zhuravskaya, 2000). Many scholars have examined the case
of China, where economic performance has been quite remarkable in recent decades.
7

Jin et al. (2005) show that China’s fiscal contracting system in the 1980s provided local
governments with strong fiscal incentives. During this period, a high overall economic
growth was maintained, while provincial governments on average retained 89 percent
of the additional tax revenues generated within their borders, and 68 percent of all
provinces enjoyed a marginal retention rate of 100 percent. Consequently, subnational
governments were inclined to provide market-enhancing public goods, to attenuate
rent-seeking activities, and to be less corrupt (Oi, 1992, 1999; Weingast, 1995; Qian
and Weingast, 1997). In addition, by exploiting an exogenous change in the
intergovernmental revenue-sharing scheme in China, Han and Kung (2015) investigate
in detail how the change in fiscal incentives for local governments induced them to shift
their efforts from boosting industrialization to facilitating urbanization. Along the same
lines, in this paper we study how local fiscal incentives might affect the extent of tax
competition among local governments, and hence the choice of local tax policies in
China.
China provides a unique institutional setting to study this issue. Tax legislation in
China is highly centralized, with the central authority stipulating the uniform taxsharing rules between the central and provincial governments. However, provincial
governments have been granted substantial discretion in determining their own taxsharing rules within their borders, which has actually given rise to a high level of
variation in sub-provincial policy. This variation is so substantial that it creates varied
fiscal incentives for local governments, significantly shaping local government
behavior across provinces. Thus, we take advantage of this variation across provinces
to examine how fiscal incentives in a province may affect the extent of local tax
competition within that province; local tax competition is often considered to be a
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crucial factor in explaining the rapid economic growth in China (Xu, 2011; Liu and
Martinez-Vazquez, 2014).
To proceed, we first build a simple theoretical model under the tax competition
framework to establish the linkage between the local tax-sharing ratio (a proxy of fiscal
incentives faced by local governments) and the extent of local tax competition within
provinces. We find that, in equilibrium, there exists a positive tax reaction function in
the setting of local tax policies, and an increase in the local tax-sharing ratio tends to
strengthen local jurisdictions’ horizontal tax reactions. Empirically, we employ
prefecture-city level panel data for the years 2004-2013 and a spatial lag model to test
the prediction, where we find supporting evidence for it.
Our findings contribute to the literature in two aspects. First, we provide explicit
evidence in support of the fiscal incentives hypothesis—fiscal incentives faced by local
governments significantly shape their policy choices. While this hypothesis has been
well discussed in the theoretical literature about fiscal federalism (see Weingast (2009)
for a detailed review), few empirical studies have examined it rigorously. We
complement this work by looking at how fiscal incentives may shape local government
tax policies, which, in turn, also reveals a novel explanation for the observed
heterogeneous tax polices across localities in China. Second, we are among the first to
provide empirical evidence on local tax competition within provinces in China. Tax
competition has long been regarded as one of the driving forces of China’s rapid
economic growth. However, most existing studies have mainly focused on tax
competition across provinces (e.g., Liu and Martinez-Vazquez, 2014). Given that it is
actually lower level governments (i.e., prefectural and county governments) that have
the most responsibility in collecting revenue and conducting expenditures in China, an
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examination of tax competition at the local level should provide a better picture for
understanding this issue.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief background
on the fiscal institutions in China. Section 3 establishes a simple tax competition model
and derives the main theoretical prediction. Section 4 develops the empirical
methodology and discusses the data. Section 5 presents the empirical results. Finally,
Section 6 concludes.

2. Institutional Background
China has maintained a hierarchical structure of governance since the formation of its current
system in 1949. Currently, there are five levels of governments in China. Starting with the
highest, these levels are the center, provinces, prefecture-level cities (hereafter, cities),
counties, and townships. Under the hierarchical system, each subnational level of government
is wholly subordinate to the next higher order of government. Thus, intergovernmental fiscal
relationships are typically defined and implemented between the government at the
corresponding level and its immediate upper level of government (i.e., center-managingprovince, province-managing-others). In the meantime, general fiscal arrangements are only
clearly defined between the central and province levels, while sub-provincial fiscal
arrangements are not formalized by any laws or regulations. Instead, the central government
grants provincial governments the discretion to set up their own intergovernmental fiscal
relationships within the provinces. Practically, provincial governments have mostly followed
the hierarchical system to determine their fiscal relationships within provinces (Martinez-
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Vazquez et al., 2008). Thus, this institutional setup implies many different fiscal arrangements
at the sub-provincial level depending on the specific province.

More specifically, the Chinese government implemented the tax-sharing system (TSS)
reform in 1994. During the reform, all taxes were categorized into three categories: central
taxes, local taxes, and shared taxes between the central and provincial governments. While
central taxes are entirely retained by the central government, local taxes are exclusively
obtained by local governments within the provinces.2 Being the most important sources of
revenue for the Chinese governments, the value-added taxes (VAT) and income taxes
(including personal and corporate income taxes) are shared proportionally between the
central government and provincial governments. In particular, the TSS reform defined the VAT
sharing ratio as 75% to the central government and 25% to provincial governments. The
sharing rule of income taxes between the central government and provincial governments has
undergone two adjustments in 2002 and 2003, respectively. That is, the central government
assigned to itself 50% of income taxes before 2002 and raised this ratio to 60% in 2003, with
the rest allocated to provincial governments. Furthermore, the 1994 TSS reform only explicitly

2

Central taxes include tariffs and tonnage taxes, excise taxes, and VAT levied by customs; excise and

income taxes from enterprises that are subordinate to the central government; and income taxes from
rail transportation, state post, state-owned commercial banks, and head offices of insurance companies.
Local taxes include business and urban infrastructure taxes (other than from the headquarters of banks
and insurance companies or rail transportation), income taxes from locally owned enterprises, urban
land use taxes, taxes on the occupation of arable land, VAT on land, property and inheritance taxes,
contract taxes, motor-vehicle and ship use taxes, agriculture taxes, banquet taxes, livestock slaughter
taxes, farmland conversion taxes, and reorientation taxes on capital construction. Shared taxes include
VAT (75% central: 25% local ), personal and enterprise income taxes (50:50 in 2002; 60:40 from
2003), excise and urban infrastructure taxes (rail transportation as well as headquarters of banks and
insurance companies 100% central, others 100% local), resource taxes (offshore 100% central, on land
100% local), and stamp taxes on security transactions (97% central: 3% local).
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stipulated the tax sharing rules between the central government and provincial governments,
leaving discretion for provincial governments to specify their own sharing rules for revenue
retained at the sub-provincial level (including city, county, and township governments). In
practice, the retained shared taxes (including 25% of the total VAT and 40% of total income
tax) are usually shared in ad hoc negotiation ratios between provincial and sub-provincial
governments across different provinces.3 In Figure 1, we depict the average value of the
corporate income tax-sharing ratio at the sub-provincial level across provinces for the sample
period 2004-2013. As shown, the average retaining ratio at the sub-provincial level varied
significantly across provinces, with a minimum value of 0.141 in Yunnan province and a
maximum value of 0.332 in Zhejiang province. Thus, the great variation in tax-sharing ratios
across provinces generates different fiscal incentives for local governments within the
provinces, which significantly shapes local tax policies.

3. A Simple Model
Consider an economy consisting of two regions i and j. In each region, the local
government chooses a tax rate 𝑡𝑖 levied on mobile capital, which eventually determines
the allocation of capital across regions. The economy implements a tax-sharing system
where both regions share a proportion 𝜆 of their tax revenues.
In particular, we assume that each region has an immobile (representative) resident,
who owns identical endowments with fixed amounts of an immobile factor (e.g., land
̅ . The production function in region i
or labor) 𝐿̅ and fixed amounts of mobile capital 𝐾
is given by 𝐹𝑖 = 𝐹(𝐾𝑖 , 𝐿𝑖 ), where 𝐾𝑖 is the amount of mobile capital and 𝐿𝑖 is the

3

See Li (2010) for a comprehensive description of the sub-provincial fiscal system in China.
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amount of a fixed production factor, such as labor or land. For analytical convenience,
the fixed factor is normalized to unity and the production function can be simplified as
𝑓(𝑘𝑖 ), which is increasing, twice continuously differentiable, and concave in the level
of capital 𝑘𝑖 , i.e.,

∂𝑓𝑖
∂𝑘𝑖

∂2 𝑓

> 0 > ∂𝑘 2𝑖 . Without loss of generality, we follow Bucovetsky
𝑖

(1991) and Hindriks et al. (2008) to assume a quadratic specification of the production,
which is well behaved over its increasing range and allows us to introduce several
simplifications. Specifically, the production function is given by
𝛽

𝑓𝑖 (𝑘𝑖 ) = 𝛼𝑘𝑖 − 2 𝑘𝑖 2 ,

(1)

where 𝛽 is the rate of decline of the marginal product of capital with the amount of
capital invested in the region; technology parameter 𝛼 is assumed to be sufficiently
large relative to 𝛽, which ensures a positive level of production and the standard
properties of the production function.
Since capital is perfectly mobile across regions, the market clearing condition
implies that the net return of capital in the two regions must be equalized; that is,
∂𝑓𝑖
∂𝑘𝑖

∂𝑓

− 𝑡𝑖 = ∂𝑘𝑗 − 𝑡𝑗 ,
𝑗

(2)

∂𝑓

where ∂𝑘𝑖 denotes the marginal production of capital and 𝑡𝑖 is the capital tax rate levied
𝑖

by region i. With equation (1) and the condition 𝑘𝑖 + 𝑘𝑗 = 2𝑘, we can solve (2) for the
capital allocated in jurisdiction i:
𝑘𝑖 = 𝑘 +

𝑡𝑗 −𝑡𝑖
2𝛽

.

(3)

As indicated, the stock of capital in region i is decreasing in its own tax rate 𝑡𝑖 and
increasing in the tax rate of the other region 𝑡𝑗 . To complete the model, we assume the
governments are partially self-interested, caring about private income, government

13

revenue, and some combination of the two. That is, the objective function 𝑊𝑖 of region
i is the sum of private income and local tax revenue:
∂𝑓

𝑊𝑖 = 𝑓𝑖 (𝑘𝑖 ) − ∂𝑘𝑖 𝑘𝑖 + 𝜆𝑖 𝑡𝑖 𝑘𝑖 ,
𝑖

(4)

∂𝑓

where 𝑓𝑖 (𝑘𝑖 ) − ∂𝑘𝑖 𝑘𝑖 is the return to the immobile factor (i.e., private income) and
𝑖

𝜆𝑖 𝑡𝑖 𝑘𝑖 represents local tax revenues, with 𝜆𝑖 (0≤ 𝜆𝑖 ≤ 1) being the capital tax-sharing
ratio for local government i.
The problem of each region is to choose its capital tax rate 𝑡𝑖 so as to maximize its
objective function (4), subject to the capital allocation rule specified in equation (3).
The first-order condition (FOC) gives
∂𝑊𝑖
∂𝑡𝑖

Taking the derivative of

1

𝑡

= − 2 𝑘𝑖 + 𝜆𝑖 (𝑘𝑖 − 2𝛽𝑖 ) = 0.

∂𝑊𝑖
∂𝑡𝑖

(5)

with respect to 𝑡𝑖 and 𝑡𝑗 , respectively, and applying

the Envelop Theorem to equation (6), we obtain
∂𝑡𝑖 ∗
∂𝑡𝑗 ∗

1−2𝜆

= 1−4𝜆𝑖 .
𝑖

(6)

Apparently, the slope of the tax reaction function of the regions depends on the
value of the tax-sharing ratio, 𝜆𝑖 . To be more specific,
∗

∂𝑡
∂( 𝑖 ∗ )
∂𝑡
𝑗

∂𝜆𝑖

2

= (1−4𝜆 )2 > 0.
𝑖

(7)

In sum, equations (6) and (7) provide the following proposition for empirical
estimations.

Proposition 1. (i) There exists a strategic interaction of local tax rates between
regions; (ii) An increase in the local tax-sharing ratio, 𝜆𝑖 , will increase the sensitivity
of the tax reaction function evaluated at the tax rate equilibrium.
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Intuitively, local governments react strategically in the setting of their tax policies
because when region j increases its tax rate, it alleviates the competitive pressure on
region i as this decision reduces the incentive of capital to relocate from i to j.
Furthermore, a larger value of 𝜆𝑖 implies a higher retained rate of tax revenues at the
local level, and hence a stronger incentive for the region to utilize tax policy to influence
capital flow for a large tax base. Correspondingly, in the Chinese context, this
theoretical exercise conveys a clear message that fiscal incentives, in the form of local
tax sharing ratios, set by provincial governments (𝜆𝑖 ) do contribute to asymmetric tax
policy responses across localities within provinces. In the subsequent sections, we
utilize data from China for empirical evidence.

4. Empirical Methodology and Data
To test this theoretical prediction, which is explicitly summarized in Proposition 1, we
rely on a panel dataset of prefecture-level cities over the period of 2004-2013 to conduct
empirical estimations.
4.1. Econometric Specification
Tax competition theory suggests that the tax rate of city i in the year t is a reaction
function of its neighboring cities’ tax rates. We therefore employ a spatial lag
specification in the most general form that has been widely used in the previous
empirical research on tax competition (Devereux et al., 2008; Jacobs et al., 2010;
Klemm and Van Parys, 2012):
𝜏𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝜏−𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝜏−𝑖𝑡 × 𝑇𝑆𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽𝑇𝑆𝑝𝑡 + 𝛾𝐗 𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 ,

(8)

15

where 𝜏𝑖𝑡 is the effective corporate income tax rate of city 𝑖 in year 𝑡, measured as the
ratio of total corporate income taxes to GDP.4 𝑇𝑆𝑝𝑡 is the corporate income tax sharing
rate at the sub-provincial level in province p, to which city 𝑖 is subordinate; since the
tax-sharing rule at the sub-provincial level is the same for all cities within a province,
we calculate it as the ratio of total retained corporate income tax revenues for all subprovincial governments to total corporate income tax revenues generated in that
province. 𝜏−𝑖𝑡 denotes the weighted average of corporate income tax rates of all other
cities, 𝑗, in the same province as p, i.e., 𝜏−𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝜔𝑖𝑗 𝜏𝑗𝑡 . Following the standard
𝑗≠𝑖

practice of the spatial econometrics literature, we define the exogenous weights as the
1

inverse distance between the cities (i.e., 𝑑 ) and normalize them so that the summation
𝑖𝑗

of all weights equal to 1, i.e., 𝜔𝑖𝑗 =

1
𝑑𝑖𝑗

∑

1
𝑑𝑖𝑗
𝑗

. 𝜏−𝑖𝑡 × 𝑇𝑆𝑝𝑡 , is the interaction term

between the weighted average tax rate and the local corporate income tax sharing ratio;
𝜂𝑖 is city-specific fixed effects, to allow for unexplained heterogeneity across
prefectures that are constant over time; 𝑡𝑡𝑡 is a linear time trend; and 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is an
idiosyncratic error term. Thus, a confirmation of Proposition 1 would predict a
significant coefficient for 𝛼 and a positive and significant coefficient for 𝛽.
𝐗 𝑖𝑡 is a set of control variables that may influence the selection of (effective)
corporate income tax rates by local governments based on the existing theoretical and
empirical literature. These include real GDP per capita, the share of secondary industry
in GDP, openness, urbanization, and population density. Real GDP per capita serves as

4

Although tax legislation in China is highly centralized, there are high levels of administrative

discretion for local governments to manipulate the effective tax rate on capital (Liu and MartinezVazquez, 2014).

16

a measure of income level. Higher incomes are generally related to greater demand for
public services that may ultimately affect a city’s choice of tax policies. The share of
secondary industry to GDP captures the effect of economic structure. Openness,
measured by the ratio of imports plus exports to GDP, points to the exposure of a city
to trade and competition for capital. Finally, urbanization, defined as the share of urban
population in the total population, and population density represent local demographic
characteristics that may characterize a city’s special needs for public goods and hence
tax policies.
4.2. Estimation
In the estimation of specification (8), tax policies of the competitors enter
contemporaneously, so that the competitors’ tax decisions are endogenous and
correlated with the error term (𝜖𝑖𝑡 ), which yields biased and inconsistent results if OLS
or fixed effect estimators are applied (Anselin, 1988). To circumvent this problem, we
employ an instrumental variables approach that has been used quite often in the recent
studies on tax competition (e.g., Foucault et al., 2008; Jacobs et al., 2010; Klemm and
Van Parys, 2012). That is, we use the competitors’ weighted real GDP per capita,
weighted share of secondary industry to GDP, weighted openness, weighted
urbanization, and weighted population density as exogenous instruments for the spatial
lag variable (𝜏−𝑖𝑡 ) in specification (8).
Additionally, in the estimations we include a linear time trend that captures a
common trend for all cities, rather than time dummies. This is because the inclusion of
time dummies in a model with spatial lag variables results in a possible multicollinearity
issue among the spatial lag variables and the time dummies, which makes it hard to
identify the true impact of each variable (Devereux et al., 2008; Klemm and Van Parys,
2012).
17

4.3. Data
The panel dataset we use for the quantitative analysis covers 279 prefecture-level cities in
China for the years 2004-2013. We exclude the four province-level municipality cities, Beijing,
Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing, as the legal status of these municipalities is non-comparable
to other regular cities. Cities in Tibet are also excluded from the sample because of data
unavailability. Given the significant change in the corporate income tax-sharing rule in 2003
at the central-provincial level, we select 2004 as the starting period in our analysis.

Data used for the calculations of the key variables are taken from various issues of the
China City Statistical Yearbooks, the China Statistical Yearbook for Regional Economy, and the
China Taxation Yearbooks. Table A1 in the Appendix provides a detailed description and
sources of all the variables, while their summary statistics are reported in Table 1.

5. Results

5.1. Main Results
Table 2 presents the estimation results for our main specification (8). To begin with, we
estimate the model by using a fixed effects approach assuming no endogeneity issue of
the spatial lag variable (i.e., the weighted average tax rates). Columns (1) and (2) report
the corresponding results from estimations controlling and not for the linear time trend.
Consistent with the prediction of Proposition 1(i), we find a positive and statistically
significant coefficient for the competitors’ weighted average tax rates, suggesting the
existence of tax competition among city governments within the provinces.
Additionally, the estimated coefficient of the interaction term between the weighted
average tax rates and the tax-sharing ratio is also positive and statistically significant,
18

confirming Proposition 1(ii) in the sense that a larger share of corporate income tax at
the sub-provincial level strengthens tax competition among city governments.
However, these results from the fixed effects estimations are very likely to be
biased due to the fact that the competitors’ weighted average tax rate is endogenous.
Therefore, we now resort to the instrumental variables estimations, where the
competitors’ weighted average tax policy 𝜏−𝑖𝑡 is instrumented by the competitors’
weighted average for the explanatory variables. The results are reported in Columns (3)
and (4) of Table 2. As shown, the estimated coefficients of the key variables of interest,
the weighted average tax rate and its interaction term with the local tax sharing ratio,
both remain positive and statistically significant. This suggests that our theoretical
prediction still holds true. Quantitatively, the estimated coefficient of the weighted
average tax rates is around 0.6 in all specifications, which is well below one, hence
ensuring the stationarity of the spatial lag model. The magnitude of the interaction term
becomes quantitatively larger when the endogeneity concern of the weighted average
of tax rates is controlled for.
While the results obtained above are clearly informative, they remain somewhat limited.
After all, the results do not directly indicate the net slope of the tax rate reaction function
over the range of the local corporate income tax sharing ratio.5 Therefore, based on our
preferred specification in Column (4) of Table 2, we graphically illustrate in Figure 2 the net
slope of the tax reaction function across the observed range of local tax sharing ratio. The
solid sloping line indicates how the net slope of the tax reaction function changes as the local

5

In the specifications with interaction terms, the statistical significance of an individual variable does not

necessarily imply that the marginal effect of it is statistically significant (see Brambor et al. 2006).
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corporate income tax sharing ratio increases, while the two dashed lines represent the 95%
confidence intervals. As shown, the net slope of the tax reaction is positive and statistically
significant over the entire range of the local tax sharing ratio, confirming the existence of
strong tax competition across localities within provinces.

For the other control variables, the estimated coefficient of real GDP per capita in Column
(4) of Table 2 is negative, potentially suggesting that richer cities might be capable of offering
more tax credits and/or other benefits to compete for capital. The share of secondary industry
in GDP has a positive and statistically significant coefficient, which may reflect the simple fact
that corporate income taxes are mainly collected from the secondary sector. Finally,
openness, urbanization, and population density are all positively correlated with the effective
corporate income tax rate, yet they are generally not statistically significant in our estimations.

5.2. Robustness
In order to test for the robustness of the main results, we conduct a sensitivity analysis
along two dimensions. First, we employ three alternative weighting matrices that are
beyond the geographical criteria initially proposed by Devereux et al. (2008) to define
tax competition patterns among cities within a province. These include uniform weights
(i.e., the simple average of all other cities in the province); weights based on the size of
the city economy, measured by total population in year 2000 (i.e., 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑗2000 ), that is,
𝜔𝑖𝑗 =

𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑗2000
∑ 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑗2000

; and weights intended to simultaneously capture the geographical

𝑗

distance between two cities and the size of the city economy, that is, 𝜔𝑖𝑗 =
1
∗𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑗2000
𝑑𝑖𝑗

∑

1
∗𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑗2000
𝑑𝑖𝑗
𝑗

.
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In the second dimension we exploit two alternative subsamples that are restricted
so as to be more comparable, and hence, less likely to be subject to certain
heterogeneous effects. First, we exclude from the sample cities located in minority
autonomous provinces. In these provinces, minority ethnic groups make up the
majority of total population, and so the primary policy objective of these provincial
governments tends to be pursuing social stability by reducing ethnic conflict, rather
than pursing local economic growth through tax competition. Second, we restrict our
estimations to a reduced sample size that excludes the capital city of each province. The
rationale here is that the legal status of a capital city is not really comparable to other
prefecture cities in the same province since they may differ dramatically in terms of
administrative and fiscal status. In addition, since provincial governments are
physically located in capital cities and since these cities are also generally endowed
with the best economic and political resources for development, we expect that capital
cities may be less involved in competition with other prefecture cities.
Tables 3 and 4 present the corresponding estimation results for the robustness
check. As shown, in all estimations, our main results remain mostly unchanged—the
weighed tax rate of the competitors is positively and significantly associated with the
effective tax rate of a city, and the estimated coefficient of the interaction term is also
persistently positive. This confirms our main argument in the paper that there exists
strong tax competition among local governments within provinces in China, and the
extent of the competition tends to be strengthened by a higher level of fiscal incentives
for local governments.
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6. Concluding Remarks
The fiscal decentralization literature has emphasized that fiscal incentives play an
important role in shaping local government behaviors and thereby affecting local
economic performance. Our paper aims to provide supporting evidence for this by
studying how local tax competition in China may be affected by the tax-sharing rules
set up by provincial governments. To this end, we first build a simple tax competition
model to show that the slope of the tax rate reaction function among local jurisdictions
is increasing with the local tax sharing ratio. We then test this theoretical hypothesis by
using a spatial lag model and a city-level panel dataset for the period 2004-2013. Our
results indicate that positively strategic tax interactions exist among city governments
within provinces and that an increase in the tax sharing ratio at the sub-provincial level
intensifies the detected strategic tax interaction among city governments. These results
largely support our theoretical predictions.
Our findings have significant policy implications. First, tax competition among
subnational governments is often considered to be a crucial factor in explaining the
rapid economic growth in China. Evidence on the existence of inter-jurisdictional tax
competition, however, is still rare, and much of the evidence is at the cross-provincial
level. Our study, thus, complements the literature with evidence on local tax
competition within provinces. Second, if rigorous tax competition among localities and
the associated distortion of local tax policies is deemed undesirable by national
authorities, there will be a need to recentralize the tax-sharing rules to organize fiscal
incentives for local governments, and hence the distortionary behaviors of local
governments.
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Figure 1. Mean of Local Corporate Income Tax (CIT) Sharing Ratio (2004-2013)
Note: Local corporate income tax is defined as the ratio of total retained corporate income tax
revenues for all sub-provincial governments to total corporate income tax revenues generated in that
province.
Source: Authors’ calculation
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Figure 2. Estimated slope of tax reaction function conditional on local CIT sharing ratio
Note: These slopes are calculated basing on specification (4) of Table 2

TABLE 1. Summary Statistics
Variable

Obs.

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Effective tax rate

3206

0.443

0.342

0.043

1.932

Weighted tax rate of neighbors

3242

0.449

0.237

0.057

1.868

Local CIT sharing ratio

3242

0.245

0.070

0.094

0.438

GDP per capita

3234

9.671

0.805

7.569

12.722

Openness

3112

0.196

0.346

0.001

2.297

Industrialization

3241

0.481

0.122

0.165

0.807

Urbanization

2779

0.352

0.191

0.100

0.998

Population density

2790

0.125

0.021

0.084

0.173

Notes: Time period is 2004-2013.
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TABLE 2. Fiscal Incentives and Tax Competition: Main Results
Fixed Effects

Fixed Effects + IV

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.576***

0.537***

0.649**

0.621**

(-7.504)

(-6.855)

(-2.208)

(-2.01)

0.442*

0.519**

1.742*

1.471*

(-1.827)

(-2.131)

(-1.695)

(-1.819)

0.248*

0.191

-0.915*

-0.678*

(-1.737)

(-1.32)

(-1.725)

(-1.721)

0.043***

-0.011

-0.048*

-0.053*

(-3.655)

(-0.459)

(-1.733)

(-1.851)

0.001*

0.002**

0.003***

0.003***

(-1.775)

(-2.219)

(-3.246)

(-3.248)

0.049

0.052

0.032

0.037

(-1.517)

(-1.605)

(-0.956)

(-1.126)

0.05

0.047

0.069

0.065

(-1.049)

(-0.996)

(-1.37)

(-1.285)

0.120***

0.076**

0.068*

0.059

(-3.986)

(-2.178)

(-1.958)

(-1.64)

City fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Time trends

No

Yes

No

Yes

Observations

2,760

2,760

2,748

2,748

R-squared

0.472

0.473

0.431

0.448

279

279

278

278

Cragg-Donald F-statistics

-

-

14.71

12.21

Hansen test (p-value)

-

-

0.754

0.742

Weighted tax rate of neighbors

Weighted tax rate of
neighbors*Local CIT sharing
ratio

Tax-sharing ratio

GDP per capita

Industrialization

Openness

Urbanization

Population density

Number of cities

Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10
percent level, respectively.
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TABLE 3. Robustness Checks: Alternative Weighting Matrices
Weight I

Weight II

Weight III

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Weighted tax rate

0.615**

0.539*

0.609**

0.516*

0.719***

0.558*

of neighbors

(-2.212)

(-1.771)

(-2.496)

(-1.722)

(-2.788)

(-1.743)

1.51†

1.196†

1.401**

1.314*

1.405**

1.559**

(-1.477)

(-1.495)

(-2.035)

(-1.869)

(-1.961)

(-2.082)

-0.687

-0.362

-0.564*

-0.411

-0.716**

-0.668**

(-1.260)

(-0.891)

(-1.694)

(-1.302)

(-2.064)

(-2.011)

-0.027

-0.032

-0.023

-0.043

-0.047

-0.062**

(-0.959)

(-1.130)

(-0.819)

(-1.502)

(-1.557)

(-2.055)

0.003*** 0.002***

0.003*** 0.003***

0.003***

0.003***

(-2.708)

(-2.616)

(-3.046)

(-3.024)

(-3.457)

(-3.491)

0.028

0.037

0.076**

0.081**

0.094***

0.095***

(-0.857)

(-1.107)

(-2.144)

(-2.325)

(-2.592)

(-2.687)

0.049

0.043

0.06

0.053

0.08

0.07

(-1.005)

(-0.896)

(-1.157)

(-1.035)

(-1.503)

(-1.316)

0.082**

0.070*

0.088**

0.066*

0.075**

0.057

(-2.387)

(-1.955)

(-2.458)

(-1.791)

(-2.009)

(-1.514)

City fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Time trends

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

yes

Observations

2,748

2,748

2,720

2,720

2,720

2,720

R-squared

0.452

0.467

0.404

0.426

0.377

0.403

278

278

275

275

275

275

Cragg-Donald F-statistic

11.17

12.11

16.37

8.627

14.16

7.512

Hansen test (p-value)

0.597

0.612

0.567

0.318

0.359

0.332

Weighted tax rate*Local CIT
sharing ratio

Local CIT sharing ratio

GDP per capita

Industrialization

Openness

Urbanization

Population density

Number of id

Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10
percent level, respectively. †represents that the variable is jointly significant at the 5% level. Weight I, Weigh II,
Weight III represent uniform weights (i.e., the simple average of all other cities in the province), weights based on
the size of the city economy, and weights based on both geographical distance between two cities and the size of
the city economy, respectively.
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TABLE 4. Robustness Checks: Alternative Subsamples
Non-minority
provinces

Non-capital cities

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.811***

0.660**

0.479†

0.503†

(-2.721)

(-2.027)

(-1.603)

(-1.581)

1.6†

1.596*

2.675**

2.196***

(-1.49)

(-1.87)

(-2.537)

(-2.608)

-1.058*

-0.879*

-1.672***

-1.327***

(-1.764)

(-1.833)

(-2.991)

(-3.183)

-0.074**

-0.081***

-0.072**

-0.075**

(-2.449)

(-2.652)

(-2.510)

(-2.532)

0.004***

0.004***

0.004***

0.004***

(-3.555)

(-3.628)

(-4.29)

(-4.315)

0.056

0.064*

0.001

0.009

(-1.542)

(-1.78)

(-0.031)

(-0.265)

0.134**

0.125**

0.068

0.066

(-2.32)

(-2.179)

(-1.261)

(-1.234)

0.047

0.033

0.06

0.052

(-1.249)

(-0.821)

(-1.441)

(-1.237)

City fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Time trends

No

Yes

No

Yes

Observations

2,457

2,457

2,512

2,512

R-squared

0.412

0.439

0.397

0.421

248

248

254

254

Cragg-Donald F-statistics

12.13

8.105

13.85

11.79

Hansen test (p-value)

0.779

0.836

0.738

0.649

Weighted tax rate of neighbors

Weighted tax rate*Local CIT
sharing ratio

Local CIT sharing ratio

GDP per capita

Industrialization

Openness

Urbanization

Population density

Number of cities

Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10
percent level, respectively. †represents that the variable is jointly significant at the 5% level. “Non-minority
provinces” represents the subsample that excludes cities located in minority autonomous provinces. “Non-capital
cities” represents the subsample that excludes the capital city of each province.

30

Appendix
TABLE A1. Description of Variables and Sources
Definition
Source
The ratio of the total
the China City Statistical
Effective tax rate
corporate income taxes to Yearbooks
GDP
The weighted average of
Authors’ calculation
effective tax rates of all
Weighted tax rate of
other cities in the same
neighbors
province, weighted by
inverse distance
The ratio of total retained the China Statistical
corporate income tax
Yearbook for Regional
revenues for all subEconomy, the China
Local CIT sharing ratio
provincial governments to Taxation Yearbook, and
total corporate income tax authors’ calculation
revenues generated in that
province
Real GDP per capita
the China City Statistical
GDP per capita
Yearbooks
The ratio of imports plus
the China City Statistical
Openness
exports to GDP
Yearbooks
The share of secondary
the China City Statistical
Industrialization
sector in total GDP
Yearbooks
The share of urban
the China City Statistical
Urbanization
population in total
Yearbooks
population
Population density
the China City Statistical
Population density
Yearbooks
Variable
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